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NOTES.
EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A REVIEW OF

time
when the tendency of government exhibits a mania for subjecting
RATE ORDERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSIONS.-At this

all human conduct to the paternal regulation of boards and com-

missions, it becomes of interest to see to what extent the due
process clause throws its aegis about the public service company
and secures to it the right to a judicial review of rate fixing orders
of state administrative agencies., The recently decided case of
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough 2 offers an opportunity of making a cursory examination of the authorities in point.
'Since the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of all
questions arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, only the decisions of that
tribunal
2 have been consulted.
Decided by U. S. Supreme Court, June 1, 1920; 64 L. Ed., 4o Sup. Ct.
Rep. 527, P. U. R. 1920 E 814.
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In the instant case it was held that the Pennsylvania Public
Service Commission Act, as interpreted by the highest court of
this State, did not satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it failed to intrust to
some judicial tribunal the duty of weighing the evidence upon
which the Public Service Commission based a rate fixing order,3
when the rate schedule so established is alleged to be confiscatory.
Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Clark dissented, differing with the
majority on the interpretation put upon the statute by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; but apparently agreeing that some
court must be invested with jurisdiction to determine the question
4
of confiscation according to their own independent judgment.
The prime importance of this decision lies in the fact that it
.clarifies the extent of the right to a judicial review of administrative rates orders, whose operation it is alleged will result in a
deprivation of property without due process of law. The right
to some species of review has been long recognized, 5 but the issue
is apt to be somewhat befogged by a failure to distinguish between
two lines of cases wherein the question of reasonableness is raised:
first, with reference to the existence or non-existence of an essential jurisdictional fact; 6 second, with reference to the confiscatory
character of a schedule of future rates.
Where it is alleged that the pre-existing rates are or are not
reasonable, the statutory authority of the commission is drawn in
issue; the question so raised is local; and the right of review is in
-general limited to ultimate questions of law. In finding the
existing rate or practice unreasonable, a prerequisite to its authority to frame an order for the future, the commission is acting in
its quasi-judicial' capacity and its findings of fact can be made
3

1n lower courts, 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 561 (xix8); 26o Pa. St. 289 (1918).
'Professor T. R. Powell takes the view that the Pennsylvania statute was
held inadequate because the Superior Court, to which a statutory appeal was
allowed, was not permitted to take new evidence; second, because every method
provided for the review of the commission's orders must be adequate in and of
izself, without regard to the excellence of other available remedies. The Supreme
Court and the Constitution, 35 Pol. SCI. Q. 411, 433. It does not appear that
it was so decided and earlier decisions indicate an act would be objectionable
*onneither score. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
162 U. S. 184, i96 (1896); Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S.510
(1912); Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 310 (1913).
5
Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S., 418, 456 (i8go), overruling
that portion of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. I13 (1876), which held that the question of reasonableness of future rates was one for legislative determination and
that "for protection against abuses by the legislatures the people must resort to
the polls,
not to the courts."
6
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as amended, which is typical,
provides in substance that the Commission shall proceed to order into effect a
new schedule of rates only upon finding the existing rates to be unreasonable.
7"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
standon present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist"-Pren.tis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226 (19o8).
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conclusive. 8 Finality is characteristic of a judicial act. It is
determining merely the application of existing law to a given body
of facts, upon which depends its jurisdiction to exert its legislative
authority, and there is nothing in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to prevent Congress or a State Legislature from committing
the determination of this question to an administrative body
rather than to a judicial. So long as the commission does not act
arbitrarily, affords hearing and acts on the evidence submitted,
"the questions of fact which might arise as to the reasonableness
of the existing rates in the consideration preliminary to legislative
action would not become, as such, judicial questions to be reexamined by the courts."9 Wherever the United States Supreme
Court has declared the findings of fact by a commission conclusive,
the question has been one of statutory power to act, and confiscation was not in issue.1
Where an order establishing a schedule of future rates, an
order legislative in character," is alleged to be unreasonable and
confiscatory under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, thequestion is one of constitutional authority to act, and the party
whose rights are thus invaded is entitled to a plenary judicial
determination of the issue so raised.12 The power and duty of
protecting rights so fundamental cannot, under our system, be
withheld from the courts. In the cases decided prior to the Ohio
Valley Case, the United States Supreme Court has been content
to declare the right to a judicial review, without discussion of its
extent. Justice Holmes in the Prentis Case 13 intimated that in
such a case fact as well as law must be tried before a court of competent jurisdiction, and the lower Federal courts have made
8
"There is no denial of due process in making the findings of fact by the
triers of fact final as to such facts "-Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn,
166 U. S. 685, 695 (1897). Due process is not necessarily judicial process:
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land, etc. Co., 18 How. 272 (1855); Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U. S.97 (1877). Nor is the right of appeal essential: Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 427 (894); McKane v. Durston,

153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894); Hibben v. Smith, I91 U. S. 310, 322 (903).
9Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 313 (1913).
1"Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S.
541, 550 (1912); Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn, 215 U. S. 481 (i9IO);
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, etc. R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235,
251 (I9ii); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. 227
U. S.88, 92 (1913); Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. I
(i915); Beale & Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1134 & cases

cited.

nPrentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226 (19o8); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co., z67 U. S.479, 499 (1897);
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. I, 8 (1909).
"Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 347 (913); Wadley

Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 66o (1915); Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.418, 458 (I8go); Missouri v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co.
241 U. S.533, 538 (1916).
"Note ii supra, p. 228.
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similar pronouncements. 14 Generalization has, in the main, characterized the decisions; as, that the right must not be merely
illusory or nominal; nor impeded by excessive penalties ;15it must
be "substantial, adequate, and safely available;" 16 the issue must
be "determined in appropriate judicial proceedings;' 17 from the
act of fixing rates by law, there results the duty to provide an
opportunity for testing their repugnancy to the Constitution."
To withold from some court the duty to weigh the evidence upon
which a rate order, alleged to be confiscatory, is predicated, as
was sought to be done, under the Pennsylvania statute, would as
effectually emasculate the constitutional right to review, as though
the order were itself made conclusive of its reasonableness."s The
fact that the party whose rates are regulated had an adequate
hearing before the commission does not alter the extent of the right
to judicial review, since the proceeding results in an order lacidng
in finality.0
The United States Supreme Court in deciding the Ohio
Valley Case, perhaps felt that the extent of the right to review
rate orders alleged to be confiscatory should at this time be delineated because of the increasing tendency to regard administrative
findings as sacrosanct, to ascribe to them conclusiveness," in utter
disregard of the principle that it is essential that these findings be
made by a body to which finality can be ascribed consistently with
the requirements of due process of law= and "under the forms and
with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages."
For that tribunal had not theretofore discussed the extent of the
right but had been content to declare its existence in general
terms, = with the result that the courts in which the question was
first raised confined themselves to a consideration of questions of
14Hearing on review may be de novo and may include taking of new evidence,

Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 164 Fed. 645,
649
(i91x).(1908); Hooker v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 188 Fed. 242, 252
-Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.123 (i9o8); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas
Co.,

212

U. S.

19

(1909); Oklahoma Operating Co., v. Love, 252 U. S. 331

(1920).

16Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, note 12, supra.
17Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, note 12, supra.
'$Missouri v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., note 12, sUpra.
"An order can only be made prima facie evidence of its reasonableness;
I
Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S.418 (189o).
2OWadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, note 12, supra; such hearing
Imerely preliminary to the legislative act," Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Garrett;
U. S. 298, 307 (1913); "the nature of the final act determines the nature of
the previous inquiry, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 211 U. S. 210, 227 (1908).
231

"Inthe Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 U. S. Stat. at Large 720, it is
expressly provided that "the findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported
by testimony, shall be conclusive."
"Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S.5o3, 515 (i9o2).
23
Supra notes 15, 16, 17, 18.
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law, viewing all questions of fact as concluded by the action of the
commission .24

E.H.S.
FALSE SHERIFF'S RETURN STILL CONCLUSIVELY TRUE IN
PENNSYLVANIA.-'Three recent Pennsylvania cases1 have brought
to life with renewed and startling vigor an ancient doctrine of law
which in modern times has shown signs of rapid decay. The
theory that a return by a sheriff, complete on its face, is a thing so
weighty that its truthfulness must be conclusively presumed between the parties concerned in the action, is a doctrine which can
hardly appeal to the reasonableness of the present day lawyer and
judge, in view of the changed conditions since the doctrine first
came into being.2 Yet the three cases mentioned re-affirm the
old rule, in spite of a recent tendency in Pennsylvania to discard
it, and moreover in one3 of the three the Supreme Court, reversing
the Superior Court4 extends the doctrine to returns by a constable
to a magistrate's court, concerning which the lower court decisions
previously had been in direct conflict. 5 The last case, however,
2The language of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 222 U. S.541, 548 (1912) to the effect that "the courts will not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence
to sustain the order," is cited with approval by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in deciding the Ohio Valley Case. 260 Pa. 289, 298 (1918). In the Union
Pacific case, however, there was no contention that the rate established by the
Federal Commission was unreasonable and confiscatory, but it was urged "that
the order was beyond the power of the Commission, because entered without
any evidence, or finding, that the rates fixed by the carriers were unjust and unreasonable." The different effect of administrative findings of facts where the
questions of statutory power and constitutional right are raised has been pointed
out. 1
Frank P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 267 Pa. i8o
(1920); Holly v. Travis, 267 Pa. 136 (1920); James G. Lindsay & Co. v. Pittsburgh 2Tin Plate and Steel Corporation, 29 Pa. Dist. Rep. 569 (1920).
' The question was subjected to a careful analysis in 1916 by Professor
E. R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan Law School, in 16 Columbia
Law Review 281.

3
Holly v. Travis, supra, footnote i. In this case the constable's return
showed personal service on the defendant in Lackawanna County, whereas the
summons in fact was not served within that county. The case was brought up
for review
by writ of certiorari.
4
Holly v. Travis, 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 527 (1919), reversed by this case,
which reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Lackawanna
County, (19 Lacka. Jur. i69).
5
Among the lower court cases holding that a constable's return is not
entitled to the same conclusive force as a sheriff's return are: Commonwealth

v. Blankenmeyer, 19 Lanc. L. R. 87 (190); Minogue v. Ashland Borough, 3o
Pa. C. C. 205 (1905); Nissley v. Hoffman Bros., 2o Lanc. L. R. 49 (1902); Neff

v. Gallagher, I6 Pa. C. C. 219 (1895). Contrato this position and in accord with
the present decision of the Supreme Court are: Keech v. Price, 16 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 766 (1907), which contains a summary of the conflicting cases; Link&
Co. v. Repple, 7 Pa. C. C. 138 (189o); Foy v. Rice, 3 Lacka. Jur. 17 (I893);
Young v. Trunkley, 22 Pa. C. C. 127 (1899).
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is in the face of a strong dissent from Chief Justice Brown,8 with
-whom Justices Von Moschzisker and Frazer concurred.
The rule that a complete sheriff's return is conclusive, and
that the only remedy for a return false in fact is by an action for
damages against the sheriff, had its origin even before the year
books of Edward III.7 It is found in Rolle's Abridgement,8 in
Kitchin,o in Comyn's Digest,o and in Coke's Institutes." Yet
in spite of the weight of the authorities in which the doctrine is
stated, the Courts in most of the United States have recognized
its unsuitability to modern conditions, and have abolished or
modified it, in a majority of instances without the aid of legislative
-enactment.12 Judicial analysis has undermined the reasons said
to support the rule,--that the sheriff being a court officer should
be believed, and that the return is a part of the records of the court
and thus not subject to attack. It is the second of these two reasons which alone is given by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its
recent decisions,13 although an earlier Pennsylvania decision had
-pointed out that the court record itself maybe subject to correction.1,
OThe Chief Justice points out that this decision with its reasoning gives
the magistrate's court the dignity of a court of record, whereas by Art. V, Sec.
io, of the state constitution it is classed among courts not of record. He denies
that the Service Act of 19o1 (July 9, 19o1, P. L. 614) in providing that service
of writs by constables shall be "with like effect as similar writs served by the
that the return made by the constable shall have the conclusive
sheriff" means
to the sheriff's return by common law.
effect given

Wr. B. i Edw. III i3 b (1327); Y. B. x Edw. III 24 b (1327); Y. B. 40
Edw. III 6 (1367); Y. B. 5o Edw. III 7 (1377). The last case is an illustration
-of the extremes to which the rule led, for in that case, where the sheriff- had returned that he had taken the bodies of two joint defendants, one of the two was
not allowed to show that the other had died before the date of the writ, for that
would be contradicting the sheriff's return.
82 Rolle's Abridgement 462 (1668).
9John Kitchin-"Jurisdictions: The Lawful Authority of Courts Leet,
Courts Baron, Court of Marshalseyes, Court of Pypowder and Ancient Dem-esne," (1651), pages 559 ff.

"0Comyn's Digest of the Laws of England, Title "Retorn," (G) "Aver.ment Against a Return."
1 2 Coke's Inst. 452 (x628)-"By the Common Law the Plaintiff could not
have an averment against the return of the Sheriff, for the Sheriff is but an officer
to the Court, and hath no day in Court to answer to the party."
"In Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (igo6), an appeal from the
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and in Mechanical
Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437 (i9o9), it was held that a Federal

court sitting in a state where the conclusive rule prevailed in the state courts,
should not follow that rule. Professor Sunderland in the article referred to above
in footnote 2, collects the cases from twenty-one states which have abolished the
rule without statutes, from six where it has been abolished by statute, from six
where it has been modified with or without statute, and from seven besides
.Pennsylvania which still maintain the rule of conclusiveness.
"Frank P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., supra, footnote
i, at page 182; "One reason therefor may be found in the fact that the sheriff's
a part of a court record."
return is
'14Vastine v. Fury, 2 S. & R. 426 (Pa. 1816), per Tilghman, C. J. at page
432: "The plaintiff in error contends, that the first return made by the sheriff
was unalterable, and conclusive. To this I cannot agree. The reason most
relied on against the amendment of the return is, that after the term the Court
-had no power to alter the record. But the ancient strictness in this respect has
been long relaxed. Judgments are every day opened, more than one term after
,.their entry; and records are amended even after writs of error brought."

-
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Pennsylvania until 1903 showed few signs of breaking away
from the old rule.:-5 In that year, in a case involving an incomplete return (to which the rule never applied), Justice Mitchell
after giving the rule as to the conclusiveness of a complete return,
stated:16 "While it is still the law that a sheriff's return is conclusive on the parties and cannot be contradicted, yet modern practice
is liberal in allowing inquiry into the actual facts where the return
itself is not full and explicit." This dictum was the basis of several subsequent decisions of the lower courts which abandoned the
old rule entirely.17 Other courts, criticizing the old rule, seized
on small differences to distinguish cases. 8 And now, by the
recent decisions, the rule is re-established in almost its original
strength. The situation in Pennsylvania today, where the sheriff's
return complete on its face is in fact false, is that in the absence of
actual fraud, the return is conclusive between the parties and the
only remedy is against the sheriff, except in two situations:
(i) Where the defendant, actually not served, has against
him a judgment by default, which he now seeks to open by appealing to the equitable powers of the court and by showing at the
same time that he has a good defense in case he is now allowed to
file an affidavit of defense. 1
(2) Where, though the return shows a proper service, the
defendant wishes to challenge his amenability to suit in the jurisdiction where suit is brought. Prior to the 1915 Practice Act, he
might do this by plea in abatement, but not by motion or rule."o
Under the 1915 Act, which abolished pleas in abatement,"1 the
Supreme Court by way of dictum in a recent opinion stated that
1Diller v. Roberts, 13 S. & R. 60 (Pa. 1825); Benham Iron Works v..
Hutchinson, ioi Pa. 359 (1882); Bennethum v. Bowers, 133 Pa. 332, 19 Atl.
361 (189o).

"6Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works;

204

Pa. 453, 54 At!. 334

(1903).
17Lyons v. Mann, 31 Pa. C. C. 24, 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 104 (1905); Miller
Paper Co. v. Keystone C. & C. Co., 28 Pa. Dist. Rep. 775 (9,9).

"sDaly v. Iselin, io Pa. Dist. Rep. 193 (igoo); Matthews v. Morris Glass
Co., 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 399 (1905); Detrich v. Sutton, i5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 621,
(19o5); Stipp Co. v. Sax & Abbott Co. 23 Pa. Dist. Rep. ii8 (i913). In the
last case, Fuller, P. J., said, "The conclusiveness of a sheriff's complete return
except in an action for false return, is an archaic proposition which ought to be.
abolished, but nevertheless is too firmly established to be ignored."
"Compare Flaccus Leather Co. v. Heasley, 5o Pa. Super. Ct. 127 (1912)
at page 130-31. See also Martin P. J., in James G. Lindsay & Co., v. Pittsburgh
Tin Plate & Steel Corp., (1920), cited in footnote i,-"The ample equitable
powers vested in the courts of this State to open judgment, on proper cause
being shown are sufficient protection to prevent injustice to litigants," resulting
from the conclusiveness rule.-Compare Phila. Rule of Court (Common Pleas)
number 149 providing for opening judgment by default, "when deemed necessary for the purposes of justice."
"0Matthews v. Morris Glass Co., 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 399 (1905); Stipp Co.
v. Sax & Abbott Co., 23 Pa. Dist. Rep. 118 (i913).
"1Act of 14th of May, 1915, P. L. 483, Section 3.
"2Frank P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., (1920) cited
in footnote 20: "Prior to the Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483, a defendant, by a
plea in abatement, could challenge his amenability to suit in the jurisdiction
where suit is brought and, under that act, may do so in an affidavit of defense."

NO ES

the proper proceeding in such a case is to challenge the jurisdiction
in an Affidavit of Defense.
On principle today it would seem that the rule of conclusiveness of the sheriff's return has outworn its usefulness, and remains
in force in a few states only because of the conservatism of the
law. This conclusion has been reached by many judges and legal
writers. It seems to have been the thought in 1918 of Justice
Kephart (then of the Superior, but now of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court), when he wrote in deciding a case2 under the rule:
"It is unnecessary for us to discuss the reasons for this rule. Until
the Supreme Court of the legislature change or modify the rule, it
must continue to be the law governing the effect of a sheriff's return regular on its face." This quotation is given by Justice Walling in one2' of the recent cases considered, in which the Supreme
Court follows the rule. From these cases it is apparent that the
Supreme Court itself is unwilling to make the desired change. The
conclusion which seems reasonable is that the time has come for
the legislature of the state to take action.
R.D.
THE USE OF CONTRACTS OF GUARANTY BY COMMERCIAL
CORPORATIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS.-Any

discussion of the doctrine of ultra vires in its relation to contracts
of guaranty made by one commercial corporation on behalf of
another, is met at the outset with the necessity for a definition of
terms. There is perhaps no portion of the law of private corporations which is so settled in its basic principle, and yet so strikingly
fugitive in its application by the court in the particular cases presented to it. Ultra vires in its proper conception is the modern
nomenclature for acts of a corporation which exceed or are beyond
the powers conferred by law upon the legal entity, acting through
any of its instrumentalities., It does not properly concern itself
with the authority of corporate agents as marked out by the corporation, nor with the power of the majority interest to act without
the consent of the minority, nor with the liability of the corporation which, having received the benefits of a contract, pleads ultra
vires in defense. Much confusion in the signification of ultra vires
has resulted from its judicial misapplication. Fundamentally, it
,concerns itself only with the question of the power of the corporation to act in the particular instance.
The modern commercial corporation is a creature of statute.
It acts only by and through the authority vested in it by its charter. It has no natural or inherent rights or capacities. The charter of a corporation, read in the light of the general laws which are
23Keystone Telephone Co. v. Diggs, 69 Pa. Super. Ct.

299

(I918) at page

.301. "Frank P.
Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co.,
supra.
'Pomeroy Specific Performance, par. 56; Reese, Ultra Vires, p. 26.
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applicable, is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration of
those powers implies the exclusion of all others not fairly incidental.2 In addition to the powers expressly conferred, the corporation possesses such powers as are necessary to carry into effect
the objects, and purposes of the incorporation 3 and "necessary"
means in this connection "suitable and proper" in view of the
corporate purpose. 4
As to the relation of ultra vires to contracts of guaranty, the
rule is generally stated to the effect that ordinarily in the absence
of express authority a corporation has no implied power to enter
into a contract as guarantor and thus lend its credit to another
corporation or person, unless directly in furtherance of its legitimate business.6 Such a definition would naturally lead to a conception that a contract of guaranty, from the mere fact that it
is a guaranty, is a species of contract foreign to corporate purposes.
It is submitted that this is a misapprehension of the nature of a
guaranty. A guaranty is merely one method of bargaining for an
economic advantage. Instead of making a present transfer of its
property in return for this advantage, the corporation in employing
it undertakes a conditional liability. Pro-vided the corporation is
bargaining directly for an advantage allowable under its charter
powers, the fact that a guaranty is made in the course of the transaction would seem immaterial. In short, the contract of guaranty
made in connection with the bargain is ancillary thereto, and does
not involve the execution of a separate power. 6 As a contract of
guaranty, by a corporation, ex vi termini, is inevitably linked up
with the undertakings and financial stability of another person or
corporation, it is natural for some confusion of thought to have
developed on the subject.
In light of the above mentioned principles, the recent decision
of the California Supreme Court in the case of Woods Lumber Co.
v. Moore 7 gives a new interpretation of the powers of corporations
2

Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 139 U.

S. 24

3

Green Bay etc. R. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co. 107 U. S. 98 (1882);

General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 248 Fed. 303, 310 (1918);

State of New Jersey v. Atlantic etc. R. Co. 77 N. J. L. 465,

72

Atl. iin (19o9).

Thompson Corporations, sec. 211o; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. People,
175 Ill. 125 (1898); Malone v. Lancaster Gas. Co. 182 Pa. 309 (1897); Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562,3o S. W. 1055 (1895).
43

52

Fletcher Corporations, p. 1869; Penna. R. Co. v. St. Louis etc. R. Co..

118 U.'S. 290 (1886); Humboldt Mining Co. v. American Mfg. etc. Co. 62 Fed.
356 (894); Bank of Memphis v. Towner, 239 Fed. 433 (1917); Lucas v.White

Line Transfer Co. 70 Iowa 541, 30 N. W. 771 (1886); Davis v. Old Colony R_
Co. 131 Mass. 258 (1881); Coleman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. IO Beav. x
(1849).(In
an early discussion of corporation guaranties, a
writer in 25 American
Law Reg. 513 (1877) views such contractsas "insidious in their nature, and more
likely to be entered into, without due consideration than an absolute agreement
to pay." The view expressed the opinion that the exercise of the right to guarantee, is the exercise of an independent corporate power. Cf. Article of C. B.
Labatt in 31 American Law Rev. 363.
719I Pac. 905 (1920).
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in the employment of guaranty contracts. The defendant corporation, organized under the laws of California, by its charter was
empowered to make films for moving picture plays, to exhibit
them to the public, to build structures for the purpose of making
such films, and to manufacture, sell and deal in all kinds of goods,
wares and merchandise. Its principal business was that of selling
and renting costumes for theatrical and moving picture productions. It was under contract to furnish the Continental Producing Company with costumes for use in a particular picture which
the latter was about to produce. The Producing Company needed lumber for the scenery, but being in poor financial standing
was unable to get it from the plaintiff. On the defendant's guaranty that the Producing Company would pay for the lumber furnished it, the plaintiff delivered the lumber, and on default of the
Producing Company sued the guarantor. The court held the
latter corporation liable on the theory that the corporation had
implied power to make the contract of guaranty for the reason
that it tended "directly" to promote its business by securing to
it the anticipated fruits of an executory contract-an advantage
which surely would have been lost had the guaranty not been made.
The case was further complicated by the fact that one Goldstein
was the principal stockholder in both the defendant corporation
and the Producing Company. The court, however, placed no
stress on this fact.
An analysis of the opinion would lead to the view that the
court in regarding the guaranty as "directly related" to the authorized business was influenced by the theory that it tended to increase the guarantor's business and secure to it the advantages
under a contract still to be executed. The court recognized the
fact that a contract of guaranty "not directly" connected with or
beneficial to the authorized business of a corporation would be
dtra vires, but it held the contract in the instant case to be not
within that category. No test is given as to what is this necessary
"direct relation" other than the enhancing of the business of the
guarantor, nor do the cases cited in support of the opinion throw
any light on the subject. If contemplated gain in business is
the measure of corporate power, it would seem that the cage represents a departure in the field of corporation law. An extended
discussion of the cases on the general subject of corporation guaranties is not the purpose of the present note, but the following
classification suggested as bearing on the case under discussion
makes it apparent that the court has, at the expense perhaps of
reaching a just conclusion, extended the rule as laid down in previous decisions.
I. The cases are in accord in holding that when from the
character of the business it is necessary for its prosecution that
another instrumentality be employed by the corporation, a power
will be implied to guarantee the obligations of this other instrumentality which is engaged in making the guarantor's business
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possible. For example, a saw mill corporation owning a tract of
timber land, inaccessible unless reached by a new railroad, was held
to have implied power to guarantee the bonds of a railroad corporation organized to serve the timber tract.8 So a corporation
organized to purchase and sell letters patent pertaining to the
manufacture of asphalt blocks, could guarantee to a foreign corporation supplying asphalt to the guarantor's licensees, the payment for these shipments. Without the guaranty the licensees
could not secure any of the necessary product.9
II. Furthermore, the decisions have recognized the implied
power to give a guaranty in lieu of purchase price or as a part of
the purchase price for property which the guarantor corporation
has been authorized to acquire under its charter,10 and it is well
settled that bonds or notes which a corporation receives in course
of business may be disposed of by indorsement and guaranty,
since the added security of the corporation's guaranty directly
adds value to the instrument, and facilitates its disposal by the
guarantor corporation."
III. A corporation may guarantee the obligations of another
corporation or person when the business of the latter is of a nature
which the guarantor corporation could itself carry on under its
charter, and which it would so engage in were it not an economic
advantage, measured by good business practice, to depend on other
agencies for the furtherance of this portion of its business. The
decisions in this connection group themselves in the main about
guaranties of rent or license fees executed by brewing companies
to aid customers who were marketing their products in the retail
trade. 12 These cases perhaps, represent the principle in its entirety.
IV. A corporation which has extended credit to a customer
may, in order to protect its debt by keeping the latter in business,
8 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser, 91 Ga. 636, 18 S. E. 358 (1893); Marbury v. Union Land Co., 62 Fed. 335 (1894); Cunningham Hardware Co. v.
Gama Transportation Co., 58 So. 740 (1912); semble Whitehead v. American
Lamp 9and Brass Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 581, 62 Atl. 554 (1905).
Edwards v. International Pavement Company, 227 Mass. 2o6, 116 N. E.
266 (i917).
0

' Eastern Township Bank v. R. Co. 40 Fed. 423 (1889); Marbury v.
Union Land Co. 62 Fed. 335 (1894); (semble) Vandeveer v. Asbury Park R.
Co. 82 Fed. 355 (1897); General Investment Company v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
248 Fed. 303 (1918); Low v. Central Pac. R. Co. 52 Cal. 53 (1877); Ellerman v.
Chgo. R. Co. 49 N. J. Eq. 217, 23 Atl. 287 (1891).

"Fidelity Trust Co. v. Louisville Gas Co. i8 Ky. 588, 81 S. W. 927 (1904);
Thomas v. Nat. Bank of Hastings, 40 Neb. 5ol, 58 N. W. 743 (1894). Note iI
Ann. Cases 893.
12Miller v. Northern Brewing Co. 242 Fed. 164 (1917); Hagerstown
Brewing Co. v. Gates, 117 Md. 348,83 Atl. 570 (1912); Timm v. Grand Rapids
Brewing Co. 16o Mich. 371, 125 N. W. 357 (1910), 27L. R. A. (N.S.) r86; Koehler

& Co. v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. i (N. Y. 1898); Realty Syndicate v. Enter-

prise Brewing Co. 170 Pac. (Ore.) 294 (i918), L. R. A. 1918 C. p. iool; Wenterfield v. Brewing Co. 96 Wis. 239, 71 N. W. IOI (1897); Cf. Interior Woodwork
Co. v. Prasser, lO8 Wis. 557 (19O).
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guarantee the customer's obligations to third parties who on the
strength of this guaranty furnish the customer with the needed
materials."3 The relation of the guaranty to the business of the
guarantor corporation in these cases is clear, as the corporation,
like an individual, should have the power to protect its outstanding accounts, and thus directly to foster its own legitimate business.
V. A corporation possesses no implied power to lend its credit
in the form of a guaranty merely because business might thereby
be induced or increased.i These cases bring up the right of a corporation, organized for a specified purpose, to further the interests
.of a business which it is not authorized to conduct, but from which
it expects profits in the way of custom and trade. Thus, a corporation organized to sell iron parts for mining plants, could not
-guarantee a building contract of a corporation organized to build
such plants, even though by means of its guaranty the former
corporation sold its product to the building corporation ;15 a lumber corporation acted ultra vires in guaranteeing performance of
a building contract by a contractor to whom it was to sell the necessary material;1" a railroad corporation, or a company organized
for the manufacture of musical instruments could not guarantee
the payment of the expenses of a festival, although the holding
-of the festival promised to increase business ;17 nor could a corporation organized to manufacture brick guarantee to save a house
owner harmless from mechanic's liens, though in so doing it was
enabled to sell its product to the contractor.'
These cases represent cogent authority for, the principle that the implied power
to guarantee does not depend upon the probability of substantial
gain to the guarantor's business. The theory upon which they
"Hess v. Sloane, 66 App. Div. .522 (N. Y. i9OI); aff. 173 N. Y. 616 (19o3)
in which a corporation having sold furniture etc. to a hotel was held on its contract to save harmless a third party who on faith of 'the contract went as accommodation indorser on the note of the hotel, thus furnishing capital with which
to run the business; Armour & Co. v. Rosenberg & Sons, 173 Pac. 404 (1918)
in which a corporation organized to manufacture and sell bottles was held liable
-on guaranty of a customer's account for salad oil with a packing company which
sold the oil, the guaranty being made to keep the customer in business; acc.
Cudahy4 Packing Co. v. Rosenberg & Sons, 173 Pac. 4o6 (I918).
I5Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, see. 88.
1 Humboldt Mining Co. v. American Mfg. etc. Co. 62 Fed. 356 (1894).
161n re Smith Lumber Co. 132 Fed. 62o (i9o4). Contra, Central Lumber
-Co. v.
7 Kelter, 201 Ill. 503 (903).
LDavis v. Old Colony R. Co. 131 Mass. 258 (188i); (semble) Western
Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co. 102 Md. 307,62 Atl. 351 (i9o5), 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 892; Elevator Co. v. Memphis R. Co. 85 Tenn. 703,5S.W. 52 (1887);
Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562,,30 S. W. 1055 (1895), Madison
Plank Road Co. v. Watertown Plank Road Co. 7 Wis.. 59 (1859); Coleman v.
Eastern Counties Ry. Co. io Beav. I (1849).
'sHoosier Brick Co. v. Floyd County Bank, xI6 N. E. 87 (1917). The
decision in this case, however, allowed a recovery on the theory that since the
plaintiff acted on faith of the guaranty, the defendant was estopped to plead
ultra vires. Cf. Kellogg Mackay Co. v. Havre Hotel Co. 199 Fed. 727 (1912);
Flint Mfg. Co. v. Kerr Murray Mfg. Co. 24 Ind. App. 350, 56 N. E. 858 (19oo).
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rest has been perhaps most aptly stated by Judge Taft in the case
of Humboldt Mining Co. v. American Mfg. etc. Co. supra when he
said "The objection to the guaranty is that it risks the funds of
the company in a different enterprise and business under the control of another and different person or corporation, contrary to
what its stockholders, its creditors and the State have the right
from the charter to expect."
In view of these authorities it is difficult to find justification
for the decision of the instant California case to the effect that
the guaranty was valid due to the fact thatit "directly" tended
to further the authorized business of the guarantor corporation.
The cases cited in the opinion with one exception all fall within
the recognized rule established by the courts upholding the.validity of guaranties by brewing companies in aid of their retailers.
The argument that the business of renting costumes is "directly"
furthered is advanced in the face of the authority of the cases.
discussed above under Class V. The reasoning of the decision
would seem to attach little importance to the necessity of reading
a corporation's powers in light of its charter and the general law,
so as to protect the rights of stockholders and creditors, and secure
the performance on one side of the obligations raised by the grant
of power from the State.
That a like result would be reached by the application of
other principles is highly probable. In one sense it might be
arguable that as the defendant corporation was by its own charter
expressly authorized to engage in moving picture productions, it
was therefore merely using the Producing Company as an agent
to carry out this phase of its charter power. There is no intimation of this view, however, in the opinion. Furthermore, in many
states, as in California, the plea of ultra vires would be of no avail
under the facts of the present case as the defendant corporation
would be estopped to allege its want of power, since the contract
had been executed on the part of the party receiving the guaranty.
While not a logical holding, such a result would be reached by the
majority of State decisions. 19 There is a tendency in this field of
corporation law, as well as in the interpretation of regulating
statutes, to get away from the strict application of the principle
of ultra vires, which developing largely in the 19th Century appears
to have been most rigorously applied in periods of our commercial
history when corporate organization and reorganization played
fast and loose with the rights of competitors and the public at
large. The present case may show a determination on the part
of the court to reach directly what it would be forced to decide
indirectly under the principle of an estoppel. It opens up the
question raised years ago under different circumstances, "To what
purpose are powers limited, if these limits may at any time be passed
9
Valuable notes on -the state of the law in this respect are available in
23

Harvard L. R. 495 and

24

Harvard L. R. 534.
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by those intended to be restrained?"
principle and authority.

The case is doubtful on
J. R. Jr.

THE ACTION FOR Loss OF SERVICES AND THE MEASURE
OF DAMNAGES TO BE APPLIED.-If a servant is injured by a third
party, the result being that his service to his master is interrupted,
the master has an action "per quod servitium amisit" even though
the third party did not thereby intend to injure the master., The
master's right of action was originally based on his right to the
services by virtue of the relation of master and servant and not
his right as contractor to enjoy the benefit of the performance of a
contract which bound the servant to render such service. This
right seems to be a relic of the time when the family was the important legal unit, the rights of which were centered in and enforced
and vindicated by its head, the father. His right to recoverfor an injury to his son or daughter was based on the injury
to him in the form of loss of service and the flimsiest evidence of
service, or even of the right thereto, was held to be sufficient to
establish this injury.2 In other words the relation of master and
servant had to exist.
In the earlier cases the servant was always a son, a daughter,
a wife, or a domestic servant, apprentice, or a laborer within the
terms of the Statute of Laborers,3 each of whom after all was at
least a member of the master's immediate, trade or business family.
In 1795, Chief Justice Eyre nonsuited a plaintiff who alleged that
an opera singer employed by him had been. assaulted by the defendant whereby the plaintiff lost his services, observing that
"ifthe present action could be supported, every man, whose servant, whether domestic or not, was kept away a day from his business, could maintain an action. IN In an early South Carolina
case, the court restricted the right to the case of domestic servants,
refusing to permit recovery for injury to a farm laborer who worked
on shares,5 and though this case was disapproved later on another
ground, 6 it may be pointed out that not only were farm laborers
originally villeins attached to the soil, but that they were the veryclass to which the Statute of Laborers was particularly applicable.
As has been stated above the right of action is derived from
the relation of master and servant and in no wise depends upon
interference with the contradt of employment. Indeed it is the
'Robert Mary's Case, 9 Coke nib (Eng. 1613); Ames v. Union Railway
Co., 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875).
2Jones v. Brown, I Esp. 217 (Eng. 1794); Kennedy v. Shea, ilO Mass.
147, 14 Am. Rep. 584 (1872).

"'Statute
of Labourers," 23 Edw. iii.
4
5Taylor v. Neri, i Esp. 386 (Eng. 1795).
Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 S. C. 7, 16 Am. Rep. 643 (1870).
6

Daniel v. Swearengen, 6 S. C. 297, 24 Am. Rep. 471 (1875); Huff v. Wat-

kins, 15 S.C. 82, 4o Am. Rep. 68o (188o).
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almost uniform trend of current authority that one entitled to a
benefit from the performance of a contract cannot recover from one
whose acts deprive him of its benefits, 7 or put him to undue expense in its performance,8 because the injury is too remote, except,
of course, in the case of intentional interference with contracts, 9
where the problem is one of an intentional tort rather than negligence.10 Therefore, there being no liability for negligently causing the impairment of a contract, the basis of the action for loss
of services cannot rest upon the interference with the contract of
employment between master and servant, but must be incidental
to and arise out of the relation of master and servant itself. The
question is then presented whether the right of action shall be
limited to the relation of master and servant as it existed when the
right of action originated, or whether it shall be extended to embrace the relation of employer and employee in all its modern
developments.
There are several early instances of the extension of the
action to cases where the relation was rather that of employer and
employee than that of master and servant in its historic sense.
In New York a merchant whose clerk was unlawfully imprisoned
recovered damages for loss of services;" while in England the
action was held to lie in a case where a "servant and traveller,"
probably a species of commercial traveller, was injured while on2
the plaintiff's business, through the negligence of the defendant.
A recent English case,' 3 however, goes much farther and allows
7
Anthony v. Slaid, ii Metc. 290 (Mass. 1846); Brink vs. Wabash Railway Co., 16o Mo. 87, 6o S. W. lO58 (1goo); La Societe v. Bennetts, (1911)
i K. B. 243; Dale v. Grant, 34 N. J. L. 142 (1870); and the same is held in acci-

dent and life insurance cases where there is no subrogation, Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. N. Y. and New Haven Railway Co., 25 Conn. 265, 65 Am. Dec. 571
(1856); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elect. Railway & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34,
1I6 N. W. 633 (19o8).
sCattle
v. Stockton Co., (1875) 1O Q. B. 453.
9
Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 (Eng. 1853); Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q. B.
333; Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 8o N. E. 817 (1907) Tubular Rivet
Co. v.5Exeter Boat Co., 159 Fed. 824 (igo8).
' An interesting variation of this rule is evidenced by a recent strike case,
Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys Overland Inc. et al. 263 Fed. 171 (1919), in which
the strike was enjoined because it prevented the employer's performance of his
contract with the petitioner. The reasoning of the Court is that since one has
a right of action against another who induces a breach of contract, so has he
against one who forces a breach. The authorities cited for this rule are all cases
in which there has been an intentional injury to the plaintiff through his contract
relation; but in this case the strike was not directed against the petitioner. The
Court overlooks the fact that the fundamental element of this type of action is
here lacking, namely the intent to injure the petitioner through his contract.
If the proposition here laid down were followed to its logical conclusion the result
would be at least alarming, for if the first contractor has a right to an injunction,
why not one contracting with him and so on. The same rule was laid down in
the similar case of Carroll v. Chesapeake & Ohio Coal Agency Co., 224 Fed.
305 (1903).

"Woodward
v. Washburn, 3 Denio 369 (N. Y. 1846).
12
Martinez v. Gerber, 3 Man. & G. 88 (Eng. 1841).
3
" Brafford Corporation v. Webster, (1920) 2 K. B. D. j35.
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recovery for loss of services where the relation of employer and employee bears little or no resemblance to the trade or business family
of the original cause of action. In this case the right of amunicipal
corporation to recover for the loss of the services of one of its
policemen injured while on duty through the negligence of the
defendant was recognized by the court and was not questioned by
the counsel for the defendant. The paternalistic feature of the
historical relation of master and servant is here totally lacking,
for the employer is an impersonal entity, a municipal corporation.
In short it would be difficult to find an example of the relation of
employer and employee farther removed from the relation of master
and servant under which the right of action originated, and it
would seem that upon the authority of this case there is no modern
instance of the relation of employer and employee to which the
right of action might not be extended.
The extension of the right of recovery for loss of service to
the relation of employer and employee in its most modern aspects
may or may not be a step in the right direction. The principles
upon which the measure of damages is based in the policeman case
are, however, fundamentally unsound. The damages were assessed in two items, first: the amount of full wages the plaintiff
corporation was forced to pay under the contract of employment
while the policeman was thought to be temporarily incapacitated;
and secondly: the amount of pension the plaintiff corporation was
bound by statute to pay the policeman from the time he was,
found to be permanently incapacitated. The first item of damages
represents the loss suffered by the plaintiff corporation because the
defendant has interfered with the contract of employment, and
arises squarely out of the contract itself. But for such an interference through negligence there is no cause of action and there
can be no recovery. It should, therefore, have no bearing upon
the damages to be granted in a cause of action of an origin entirely
distinct from the contract of employment. The gist of the action
is the loss of services and the measure of damages universally laid
down consists in the general value of such services in that line of
employment, plus the cost of replacing the servant, 14 not the value
of the particular servant to his master, 15 nor the amount the master
may be forced to expend because of some other relation between
himself and his servant. In this connection it is interesting to
note a dictum of Lord Sumner of the House of Lords in dealing with
an action for loss of services, where a voluntary pension had been
paid. "The damages must be measured by the value of his services which were lost, not by the incidents of his remuneration under
the terms of his contract."16
' 4 Hays v. Borders, 6 Ill. 46 (1844); Kelley v. Mayberry Township, 154
Pa. 440, 26 Ati. 595 (1893); Sawyer v. Sauer, io Kan. 519 (1873).
SCain v. Vollmer, i9 Idaho 163, 112 Pac. 686, 32 L. R. A. N. S. 38, note
(1910).

"'Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika, (1917) 1 App. Cases 38,
61. This language is obiter dictum because it was held there could be no recovery
for the death of an employee upon the authority of Baker v. Bolton, i Camp.
493 (Eng. i8o8).
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The second item of damages fails equally to fall within the
generally accepted measure of damages. The obligation of paying
a pension is placed upon the employer by operation of a statute and
is analogous to the burden placed upon an employer to pay compensation to his injured employees by operation of the usual State
Workman Compensation Acts. Under the New Jersey Employer's
Liability Act,17 which gives no right of subrogation, it has been
held that compensation paid an injured employee could not be
included in the damages granted in an action for loss of services.s
It is submitted that this principle is correct and should have been
applied in the policeman case, for it is the expressed intention of
this class of statute that the employer shall bear the burden of the
employee's incapacity.
The policeman case is, therefore, interesting in that it takes
for granted that there is a right of action for loss of services in
a case of employer and employee where there is not a shadow of
the original trade or business family under which the action grew
up, but is of doubtful soundness in its radical departure from the
proper measure of damages.
G. R. R. J"r. and F. H. B. Jr.
THE PRIVILEGED CHARACTER OF ANTI-MARITAL TESTIMONY.

-"It hath been resolved by the justices, that a wife cannot be
produced either against or for her husband, qua sunt duae animae
in carne una."' Although the husband's privilege of not having
his wife testify against him had been recognized previously,2 this
seems to have been the first authoritative statement of it. The
true reason for the rule, however, is probably that suggested in
Wigmore's Evidence,' namely, that the wife's act of testifying
against her husband, especially in criminal cases, where she might
be the means of sending him to his death, would be, in effect, but
one step from the crime of petit treason. This offence was still
recognized at the time the rule arose, and consisted of violence to
the head of the household by a member of it, whether, wife, child
or servant. But since this reason was not enunciated in any decision, Lord Coke's rather metaphysical explanation was in favor
for a time. Since then, however, as has been the case with many
other rules of evidence, the courts, from time to time, have not
hesitated to invent new and different reasons for supporting the
privilege, so as to make it fit into their respective schemes of legal
philosophy. With a very few exceptions they have united in
believing the rule to be a good one, and have justified and enforced
"7Employer's Liability Act of NewJersey, Chapter 95, Laws, Session of 1911.
18Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Elect Co., 86 N. J. L. 26,
9o Ati. 1o62 (i914).

'Coke on Littleton, 6b, (1628).
'Bent v. Allot, Cary 94 (Eng. 158o).
3§ 2227.
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it, except where it has been modified or abolished by statute. The
explanation most generally given in recent years is that the privilege, now extended to the wife as well as to the husband, is based
"entirely on the ground of public policy. It is necessary to preserve family peace and maintain that full confidence which ought
to subsist between husband and wife."' This reason-or excuse,
as it might better be called-for maintaining the privilege, as well
as the others which have been advanced, was strongly attacked
by Bentham,s and shown to be unjustifiable, unless on purely
sentimental grounds. Yet, since the rule persists generally, it is
perhaps better to have it supported on a pillar of mere sentiment,
however weak and fallible, than, by destroying the pillar, to make
of the rule a Mohammed's coffin of the law.
It is not strange that such a broad and arbitrary rule should
early have been recognized as subject to some exceptions. The
first of these to appear, being applicable to cases involving corporal
violence inflicted by one spouse on the other, had its genesis in
Lord Audley's Trial,' where it was resolved by the judges that
"in a criminal cause like this, where the wife is the party grieved
and on whom the crime is committed, she is to be admitted as witness against her husband." Many other exceptions to the general
rule have arisen similarly; to meet particular conditions. So numerous are the exceptions, indeed, that the rule may fairly be said
to be unfitted for general and consistent application. One might
well feel justified in believing, as scientists do, that a rule subject
to so many exceptions is prima facie incorrect.
The recent Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Bricker,
involves two of these exceptions, which might better be considered
as questions of construction of the rule. In that case the defendant was charged with having caused the death of Sarah Feinberg
by performing an abortion on her. The husband of the deceased
woman was offered as a witness. It was objected that such testimony would, in effect, be testimony against .his wife. It was held
by the Superior Court, however, that he was a proper witness.
The first question raised by Commonwealth v. Bricker is
whether or not the general rule applies where the wife (or husband,
as the case may be), against whose interest the testimony of the
spouse is offered, is not a party to the suit. The earlier view was
that the privilege existed, especially in criminal cases, and included
"evidence which may even tend to criminate the other. The
objection is not confined merely to cases where the husband and
wife are directly accused of any crime, but (applies) even in collateral cases."a This view has been taken in Pennsylvania and in
4Sharswood, J., in Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281 (x868).

$Rationale of judicial Evidence, book IX, part IV, chap. V, sect. IV
(1827).
63 How. St. Tr. 401 (Eng., 1631).
774 Pa. Super. Ct. 234 (1920).
8Rex v. Cliviger, 2 T. R., 263 (Eng., 1788).
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a number of other states.9 It has been carried so far as to exclude
a husband's testimony against one on trial for adultery with his
wife, although the wife had previously been acquitted on the same
charge arising out of the same particular act. 0 If the peace of
the family is the true reason for the privilege, strict logic would
require that it be allowed in collateral proceedings. In England,
however, the courts soon repudiated their earlier view, and, together with many jurisdictions in the United States, now hold
that there is no privilege in such cases.". The courts which refuse
to allow the privilege, do not, it seems, have the courage of their
convictions, since in the majority of cases they carefully explain
that they only refuse it because such testimony could not be used
as an instrument of further prosecution. It would be difficult to
say whether or not the weight of authority supports the allowance
of the privilege in collateral proceedings. The tendency appears
to be toward a refusal to allow it.
In Pennsylvania the privilege is now regulated by statute,12
and it is provided that, in criminal cases, husband and wife shall
not "be competent or permitted to testify against each other."
The court, in Commonwealth v. Bricker, construes this "to prohibit
testimony of either party to the marriage relation so far as to incriminate the other party to the contract," even in collateral proceedings. This, in effect, makes no change in the common law
view previously taken in the state.
The Superior Court, however, then proceeds to show that the
rule is not applicable in Commonwealth v. Bricker, since the deceased
woman was in no sense a participant in the crime. There is some
conflict of authority as to whether or not a woman on whom an
abortion is performed is guilty of any criminal offense in voluntarily submitting her body for the act. It seems clear that she is
not a principal, unless by statute. 3 It has also been held in Pennsylvania, in accordance with the weight of authority, that she is
not an accomplice or accessory, but is looked upon rather as the
victim, although she herself may have solicited the act.14 There
have been several suggestions, however, and one definite adjudication, that a woman might be guilty as a party to a conspiracy to
9

johnson v. Watson, 157 Pa. 454,

27

Atl. 772 (1893).

State v. Welch, 26 Me. 30 (1846).

People v. Fowler, 104 Mich. 449, 62 N. W. 572 (1895).
Graves v. Harris, 117 Ga. 817, 45 S. E. 239 (1903).

10

State v. Wilson, 31 N. J. L. 77 (1864).
"Rex v. All Saints, 6 M. & S. i95 (Eng. 1817).
State v. Dudley, 7 Wis. 664 (2859).
State v. Briggs, 9 R. I. 362 (1869).
State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).
of 23 May, 2887, P. L. i58, §2(b), as amended by Act of ii May,
1911, "Act
P. L. 269, §1.
Corpus Juris 315.
.,Commonwealth v. Weaver, 6i Pa. Super. Ct. 571 (1915).
"i1

Commonwealth v. Wood. 2n Gray 85 (Mass. 2858).
People v. Veeder, 98 N. Y. 630 (1885).
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procure an abortion on herself.'$ This is directly contrary, in
point of reasoning, to the well-recognized ruling that a man and
woman cannot conspire to commit adultery with each other.x+
The ground for this- is that the planning of a crime by the parties
necessary to its consummation can amount to nothing more than
preparation, or at most an attempt, and does not furnish the element of accession, from which the aggravation necessary to common law conspiracy may be drawn. The same principle is applicable to abortion, since the woman on whom the act is to be committed is a necessary party. The court, in Commonwealth v.
Bricker, took this view, and decided that the deceased woman
was not guilty of any crime in permitting anfabortion to be performed on herself. Hence testimony that she had done so could
not incriminate her, with the result that the privilege could not
be invoked to exclude her husband as a witness.
Another question raised by Commonwealth v. Bricker is
whether or not the privilege continues after the death of one spouse,
so as to bar the survivor's testimony "in disparagement of the
conduct or property of the deceased." If the privilege exists in
such a case, it must be in order to prevent the breaking of the
marital peace of the hereafter, which seems difficult of comprehension, in view of the assurance that there "they neither marry
nor are given in marriage." It has been maintained in some cases
that such a post-mortem privilege exists.17 The better and more
prevalent view, however, holds that there is no privilege after the
death of a spouse.18 It seems probable that the cases supporting
a post-mortem privilege, as suggested in Dean Wigmore's Evidence,19 were so decided as a result of confusing two radically different privileges, the, e as to general testimony against the conduct or property of the spouse, and the other as to confidential
marital communications. It is universally conceded that the latter survives after the death of husband or wife, and because of the
general similarity of the privileges, it is quite conceivabli that they
should -have become confused. The court, in Commonwealth v.
Bricker, after considering the question, followed the prevalent
rule, and held the husband's testimony to be admissible on this
ground also.
A.C.S.
15
Regina
16

v. Whitechurch, L. R. 24 Q.- B. Div. 42o (Eng. i890).
Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226-(1850).
Miles v, State, 58 Ala. 390 (1877).

1O'Connor v. Marjoribanks, 4 Man. & G. 435 (Eng.,-1842).
Dickerman v. Graves, 6 Cush. 3o8, (Mass., 185o).
William & Mary College v: Powell, 12 Gratt. 372 (Va. I8S5).
"Pennsylvania v. Stoops, Addison 381 (Pa. 1799).
Walker v. Sanborn, 46 Me. 470 (859).
Jackson v. Barron, 37 N. H. 494 (1859).
"9§2237.
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SHOWN

TO

DEFENDANT'S

EMPLOYEES-

OCCASION HELD PRIVILEGED.-It is a broad rule of law that the

showing of a letter containing defamatory matter by the writer
to any person other then the addressee is a publication., This
rule has been subjected to the exception that where there is a community of duty or interest in the subject matter of the letter between the writer and the person to whom the letter is shown, it is
a privileged occasion.2 A modern outgrowth of this long-established principle is found in the proposition advanced in a recent
case that the scope of this privilege covers all the incidents of the
transmission and treatment of the communication which are in
accordance with the reasonable and usual course of business.3
In this case a letter had been written to the plaintiff based on
statements of the defendant's bill collector that certain receipts
had been tampered with. The letter, intimating that the plaintiff had done the tampering, was composed partly by the defendant's
general manager and partly by the bookkeeper, and had then been
shown to the bill collector. No malice having been found, the
occasion was held conditionally privileged since each of these
persons had a duty to perform for the defendant respecting the
letter, and the performance of this duty was the usual course of
doing business in such a matter.
Neither in England nor in this country are the authorities in
accord on this subject. Two distinct lines of cases have arisen
within the past thirty years which are difficult of reconciliation.
The one view of the question is presented by the line of decisions
following the case of Pullman v. Hill.4 In that case it was held
that the dictation of a libel by an officer of a mercantile company
to a stenographer employed by it, and its delivery to an office boy
to have letter press copies made, when the communication itself
was not privileged, constituted a publication; and that since the
occasion was not privileged, the publication was actionable. This
rule but followed the long recognized principle of pre-typewriter
days that the getting a libelous letter copied in writing for one by
another is a publication;5 and the application of the strict language
of this rule has since been frequently made in America in deciding
that the dictation of a letter to a stenographer is in any case a
publication.6
The rule of the Pullman case, where it has been followed, has
been understood to hold clearly that dictation to a typist is publi'Pullman v. Hill (1891) i Q. B. 524.
2Blackham v. Pugh (1846) 2 C. B. 611, 15 L. J. C. P. 290.
'Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 265 Fed. 873 (1920).
4(1891) I Q. B. 524.
5Kiene v. Ruff, I Iowa 482 (1855); Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250, 94
Am. Dec. 455 (Va. 1867).
'Gambril v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 At. 730 (1901); Sun Title Insurance
Co. v. Bailey, ioi Va. 443, 44 S. E. 692 (1902); Puterbaugh v. Gold Medal
Manufacturing Co., 7 Ont. L. R. 582, I Am. Cas. 100 (1904); Ferdon v. Dickens,
161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (19o9).
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cation. Yet the rule of that case is in reality far less broad. The
basis of the decision lay in the fact that there was no duty on the
part of the defendant to write this letter, and no duty on the part
-of the typist to take it for dictation, and that the dictating and
,copying of the letter were not a part of the usual and reasonable
-conduct of the defendant's business; and this is recognized clearly
by Lord Esher, who had delivered the court's opinion in the Pullman case, when in another case three years later he so defined his
own ruling.7 In this latter case, where a solicitor had dictated to
his stenographer a letter containing libelous statements and this
letter was afterwards copied into a letter book by another clerk,
the letter was held not actionable since it was the duty of the
solicitor to write this letter and it was also his duty to handle the
matter in the ordinary way of doing business; and since the ordinary manner of doing his business included dictation to a steno-grapher and copying by a clerk, such an occasion was privileged.
The apparently conflicting rules of these two cases 8 faced
the English courts later; and the present English rule as developed
therefrom is best given by Collins, M. R., when in following the
-decision of Boxsius v. Goblet Freres, supra,he comments on the two
earlier decisions: "The result of these two cases to which I have
alluded, taken together, appears to me that, where there is a duty,
whether of perfect or imperfect obligation, as between two persons, which forms the ground of a privileged occasion, the person
exercising the privilege is entitled to take all reasonable means of
doing so, and those reasonable means may include the introduction of third persons, where that is reasonable and in the ordinary
,course of business; and, if so, it will not destroy the privilege.",
And this interpretation of Lord Esher's rule has been the one consistently followed in England. 0
American courts have generally thus far followed the strict
rule of the Pullman case; but recently there has been an inclination shown in some cases to turn toward the present English rule.t
One recent American casen has decidedly accepted it as being in
accord with the business necessities of our day. The language of
the court in this case clearly adopts this view: "It is inconceivable
how the business of the country, under the present conditions, can
be carried on, if a business man or corporation must be subject to
litigation for every letter containing some statement too strong,
-where it is only sent to the person to whom directed, and only
heard by a stenographer to whom the letter is dictated." It is
7Boxsius v. Goblet Freres, (1894) I. Q. B. 842.
sPullman v. Hill and Boxsius v. Goblet Freres, supra.
9Edmonston
v. Birch & Co., (1907) 1. K. B. 371.
' 0 Morgan v. Wallis 33 T. L. R. 495 (Eng. 1917); London Association v.
Greenlands,
L. R. (i9i6) 2 App. Cas. 22.
11
Nichols v. Eaton, nio Iowa 5o9, 81 N. W. 792 (i9oo); Phillips v. Bradshaw, 167 Ala i99, 52 So. 662 (1910).
u2Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel, 113 Miss. 359, 7 So. 278 (1917).
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reasonable to be expected that this rule will henceforth prevail;
the principal case seems to show that tendency. Modern conditions of business are such that a man cannot himself write his
business letters; and in business it is often necessary to include in
correspondence statements defamatory of the recipient of theletter. To subject a business man to action for civil or criminal
libel for conducting his business in the ordinary way, when his.
interests require that in good faith he write a defamatory letter,
would be to apply a too oppressive rule of law.
The solution to this question is probably best stated by Earl
Loreburn in a recent case13 in which he says: "The facts of different cases vary infinitely, and I do not think that the principle can
be put more definitely than by saying that the judge has to consider the nature of the duty or right or interest, and to rule whether
or not the defendant has published something beyond what was
germane and reasonably appropriate to the occasion, or has given
it a publicity incommensurate to the oceasion." On such a view
as this, business necessity can be convenienced; and still a man
will not be permitted to go far afield from business interests to use
his office facilities for writing defamatory letters which are not
within
the scope of the reasonable and usual conduct of his busi14
ness.
Another view of this question which is favored by some courts
is that such communications are not actionable because the stenographer or other employee to whom the communication was made
before it was mailed is not a third person, within the technical
meaning of such term, but is merely an impersonal facility used in
making and transmitting the communication. Under this view
it has been held that dictation to a stenographer by an officer of a
corporation is not a publication.15 This rule has been held as well
to apply between members of a partnership. 16 And it has been
extended so far in one case as to govern communications between
any fellow employees of a corporation.17 The soundness of this
rule, however, may well be questioned. Individual identity is
not lost by one's being a member of a firm or an employee of a
corporation; and such business status does not destroy the ability
of an officer, partner or employee to form individual opinions and
express them. While The Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, supra,
does not repudiate this proposition, Judge Smyth does not accept
it. He puts his decision squarely on the ground that duty to write
this letter made the occasion conditionally privileged, and that
13
London
14

Association v. Greenlands, supra.
As to probable limits of such rule, see notes in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361;
L. R.
1 A., 519i5E, 131.
( 97
-'Owen
,
v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. S. io33
(1917).
1

6Kirschenbaum v. Kaufmann, 5o N. Y. L. J. 4o6 (1913).

17Central of Georgia Railroad v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E.
(1917).
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-since no malice was shown, everything done by the defendant was
done in the ordinary course of conducting the business; that being
-so, the occasion remained privileged.
B. C. J.
Is A CONVICTION ON A VOID INDICTMENT A BAR TO A SUB-

SEQUENT PROSECUTION?-It is an established mayim of the
-common law1 incorporated into the Federal Constitution 2 and made
a part of the fundamental law of every state3 that no man shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. However well established this doctrine is, it is often difficult to determine whether,
-on a given state of facts, former jeopardy can be pleaded as a bar
to a second prosecution.
The general rule is that there can be no jeopardy where the
indictment is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. 4 Such an
indictment may be either void or defective. It is void where it
does not state an offense, 5 or where it was found by a grand jury
-which was illegally organized ;6 while it is defective where it states
.an offense and was regularly found, yet because of errors in form
or substance it is insufficient to sustain a conviction and would
be reversed on error.7 The theory upon which the above rule of
jeopardy is based is that it would be a contradiction in terms to
say that a person was put in danger of his life or liberty by an
indictment under which he could not be convicted; for the law
will presume that the court will discover the defect in the indictment in time to prevent the defendant's beirig convicted.8 Thus,
it is universally held that a conviction and judgment upon a defective or void indictment is not a bar to another prosecution for
14 Blackstone's Commentaries, 335; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548,
77 Am.2 Dec. 689 (i86o), scmble.
.
Constitution of the U. S., Amend. V: "Nor shall any person be subject
for the3 same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Alabama, Const. of igoi, Art. I, sec. io; California, Const. of 1879, Art.
I, sec. 13; Colorado, Coast. of 1876, Art. II, sec. i8; Delaware, Const. of 1897;
Indiana, Const. of 1851, Art. I, sec. i4; Kentucky, Const. of 189o; Maine,
Coast. of i819; Ohio, Const. of 1851, Art. I, sec. io; Pennsylvania, Const. of
1873, Art.
I, sec. io.
4
Kohlheimer v. State, supra; Robinson v. State, 52 Ala. 587 (1875);
'State v. Smith, 88 Iowa, 178 (1893); People v. Terrill, 133 Cal. 12o, 65 Pac.
.303 (1910); Kenny v. State, 121 Md. 120, 87 Atl. 1109 (1913), sembk; Bishop:
New Criminal Law, 8th ed., Sec. 1021, par. 2.
5State v. Bogard, 25 Ind. App. 123, 57 N. E. 722, 8i A. S. R. 84 (Ioo);
People v. Terrill, supra.
6Kohlheimer v. State, supra; Finley v. State, 6i Ala. 201 (i878); U. S. v.
Jones, 31 Fed. 725 (1887); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 219 (1901); Stephens
v. State,
50 So. 42 (Ala. i909).
7
Commonwealth v. Phillips, i6 Pick. 211 (Mass. 1834); Shook v. State,
25 Tex. Cr. App. 345 (888); U. S. v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1895); State v. Keating, 202
Mo. 197 (1907).
8
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, vol. II, ch. 35, sec. 8; 4 Criminal Law
-Magazine, 487, 49o; People v. McNealy, 17 Cal. 332, (i86i) semble.
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the same offense where the judgment has been reversed. 9 And
the same rule is followed where the indictment is void and the.
judgment remains unreversed.10
However, it is held that if judgment is rendered upon a verdict of guilty found upon a defective indictment, the defendant
cannot be prosecuted again for the same offense while the judgment
remins unreversed.1
Mr. Bishop expresses the basis of these
decisions as follows: "After a verdict of guilty on such an indictment (i. e. defective), and judgment is rendered thereon, there cart
be no second prosecution while the judgment is unreversed,-not
because there has been a jeopardy, for there has not, but becausethe judgment is voidable only, and of the same effect while it stands
as a valid one."12 What then is the effect of a valid judgment?
In civil actions such a judgment is a bar to a second action on the.
doctrine of res judicata. But apparently this doctrine is not
applicable to criminal cases. It would seem that the corresponding
doctrine in criminal prosecutions is that of double jeopardy.
Wells in his book on Res Ajudicata and Stare Decisis says: "Theprinciple (i. e. in criminal cases)-which is parallel to the principle
prevalent as the fundamental rule in civil cases-is, that no oneshall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. "3 Thus wherethere is no jeopardy, there is nothing to prevent another prosecution and the above decisions which hold an unreversed voidable
judgment a bar would seem to be erroneous.
A more difficult application of the doctrine arises where the
defendant has been convicted on a defective indictment in a court
of competent jurisdiction and has suffered the full punishment
prescribed by law. In such a case it is held that he cannot be
prosecuted the second time for the same offense; and this is true,
although the judgment on which the sentence was rendered was
so defective that it would have been reversed on error."4 In Commonwealth v. Loud," the leading authority on this subject, the
defendant stole some lumber and was arraigned before a justice
9People v. Casborous, 13 Johns. 351 (N. Y. 1816); U. S. v. Jones, supra;
State v. Lee, 114 N. C. 844, i9 S. E. 375 (1894); U. S. v. Ball, supra; State v.
Foley, 1i4 La. 412, 38 So. 402 (1905); State v. Keating, 223 Mo. 86, 122 S. W.
669 (igog); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U. S. I55 (1910); State v. Washing-ton, 84 Wash. 113, 146 Pac. 378 (1915).
"0Davidson v. State, 99 Ind. 366 (1884); State v. Bogard, supra; Ogle.
v. State, supra; Kohlheimer v. State, supra, (semble).
"Fritz v. State, 40 Ind. 18 (1872); Ford v. State, 7 Ind.App. 567, 35 N. E.
34 (1893); Bishop: New Criminal Law, 8th ed., sec. 1O21, par. 3; 2 Hale P. C..
248.
"Bishop: New Criminal Law, 8th ed., see.
1021, par. 3.
"Wells: Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisis, p. 318.
"Commonwealth v. Loud, 3 Metc. 328, 37 Am. Dec. 139 (Mass. 1841),State v. George, 53 Ind. 434 (1876); Davis v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 359, 39

S. W. 937 (1897); Ford v. State, 7 Ind. App. 567, 35 N. E. 34 (1893), semble;Cherry v. State, 103 Miss. 225, 60 So. 138 (1912), semble; 2 Ben. and H. Lead..

Cases 554.
153Metc. 328 (Mass. 1841).
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of the peace on a defective complaint for larceny. He was convicted and fined, which fine and costs he paid. Later he was tried
in the common pleas for the same offense. He then proposed to
prove a prior conviction of the same offense as a bar to that indictment and offered, for that purpose, a record of the prior proceedings before the justice of the peace. The court held this a
good defense, Putnam, J. saying: "The judgment that the defendant was guilty, although upon proceedings which'were erroneous,
is good until the same be reversed. It was the right and privilege
of the defendant to bring a writ of error, and reverse that judgment; but he might well waive the error and submit to and perform judgment and sentence, without danger of being subjected
to another conviction and punishment for the same offense."
Apparently there has been no legal jeopardy because the indictment was defective and had the defendant moved in arrest of
judgment the conviction would have been reversed. But the
courts seem to proceed on the ground that the defendant, by
acquiescing in the judgment and sentence, has waived all errors in
the indictment, thereby giving it the effect of a valid one. Since,
therefore, the indictment had the effect of a valid one, jeopardy
attache& and he could not be prosecuted again for the same offense.
This reasoning would seem to be correct. Other courts have
reached the same conclusion by proceeding on the ground that by
serving his sentence the defendant has paid his debt to the state
and cannot be made to pay again.16 These decisions, however,
cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of jeopardy since the indictment was not sufficient to sustain conviction.
The real difficulty arises where the indictment instead of
being merely defective is void and the defendant undergoes sentence. In such a case it would seem that if the sentence has been
executed, the accused could not be prosecuted the second time. 7
With the exception of the recent case of State v. Collins, decided
by the Supreme Court of Washington, 18 no decision has been
found directly in point. But the dicta are so strong that they
cannot be ignored. *In Kohlheimer v. State, 9 Harris, J. said: "It
seems to be clear, therefore, upon principle as well as authority,
that neither at common law nor by our constitution, will an acquittal or conviction, where the penalty has not been inflicted, upon
a void proceeding or indictment, operate as a bar to a subsequent
indictment for the same offense." The only inference that can
"8Davis v. State, supra; State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 555, 12 S. W. 369 (1889),
sembk; Ford v. State, supra (semble), Cherry v. State, supra (semble).
"7Bishop, New Criminal Law, 8th ed., sec. 1023: "After the erroneously
convicted person has suffered the full punishment of the law, another principle,
yet probably not our constitutional guaranty, intervenes to prevent a second
prosecution. It would resemble a civil suit to recover a debt already paid, and
the punishment paid is no more due a second time than a civil debt."
8,1I Pac. 831 (Wash. 1920).
"39 Miss 548, 77 Am. Dec. 689 (i86o).
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be drawn is that if the penalty has been inflicted and undergone on
a void indictment, it would bar a second indictment. Other dicta
proceed on the ground that the defeftdant has satisfied the demands
of the law and cannot therefore be again tried for the same offense.2
This expression of the law cannot be reconciled with the doctrine
of double jeopardy. As we have seen above, if the indictment is
void, jeopardy does not attach. Nor can it be argued that the
defendant by serving his sentence waives the errors. "The defendant may waive erroneous or voidable proceedings but it is
neither in the power of the defendant, nor of the court, nor even
of the Legislature itself, to give validity to a void prosecution, or
a void judgment upon a void indictment." 21 The defendant,
therefore, was not in legal jeopardy. If he underwent the sentence
he was doing voluntarily what he was not legally compelled to do,
for he was at perfect liberty to assert his freedom by force. Although in fact he was in jeopardy, legally he was not; and for
this reason he could not interpose a plea of autrefois convict. The
only ground upon which the serving of sentence on a void indictment can be pleaded as a bar to a second prosecution is that of
fairness and justice.
It would seem that in such a situation as this, the defendant
should be protected so that he could not be compelled to serve a
second sentence for the same offense. The doctrine of double
jeopardy, however, does not give him this protection. The reason
that it fails in such a case is because the rule which requires that
the indictment be valid before there can be jeopardy is founded
on the assumption that the courts are infallible. The legal presumption is that the court will discover the defect in the indictment in time so that the defendant will not be convicted2 and
therefore the doctrine does not consider a case where the defect
has not been discovered and the defendant has suffered the penalty.
A better example of this situation cannot be
23 found than the recent
case of State v. Collins mentioned above.
In that case Collins was arraigned before a justice of the
peace on a complaint charging him with having "struck George
Vath with his hand." He was convicted and fined and upon the
payment of the fine was discharged. Later an indictment charging an assault was filed against him for the same offense. To this
indictment he interposed a plea of former conviction by offering
a record of the prior proceedings before the justice of the peace.
This evidence was rejected and on error the Supreme Court held
the ruling of the lower court correct. This case turned on the fact
that the first complaint was insufficient to state an offense, Fullerton, J. saying: "In the absence of a statute to the contrary, there
21Ford v. State, supra (semble); Cherry v. State, supra, (semble); Bishop,
New Criminal Law, 8th ed., sec. 1023.
"1Per Harris, J., in Kohiheimer v, State, supra.
"Note 8, supra.
3191 Pac. 831 (Wash. _.2o).
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can be no lawful conviction or acquittal upon an information,
indictment or complaint which is insufficient to state an offense,
and hence no plea of former jeopardy thereon." The court in its
opinion laid no stress on the fact that the defendant had already
suffered the penalty but placed the decision entirely on the ground
that the indictment was void. Thus the decision would be the
same whether punishment had been suffered or not. Applying
strictly the doctrine which requires a valid indictment before former
jeopardy can be pleaded, the decision is correct. Since the indictment did not state an offense known to the law, it was void24 and
thus legal jeopardy did not attach. The fact that the defendant
suffered the penalty did not change the situation, since, unlike the
cases where the indictment is merely defective, it was not within
his power to waive void proceedings and a void judgment. Therefore there was nothing to bar another prosecution for the same
offense. But in view of the dicta above mentioned and on principles of fairness and justice the decision is in error. The defendant has paid the debt which the law demands for his crime and he
should not be compelled to pay it a second time for the same
reason that a civil court should not compel a debtor to pay his
creditor twice for the same debt. To hold otherwise would be to
place in the hands of the state a dangerous instrument of persecution contrary to the reason upon which the rule of double
jeopardy
25
is founded, i, e., Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.
F. H. K., Jr.
24
Note
5

5, supra.
2 Broom, Legal Maxims, 8th ed., p. 348.

